【按：本月挑選的The Diplomat付費文章，前瞻了2022年可能出現的亞太區國際形勢，每一個主要區內國家都由專家學者預測三件事，很值得參詳。】

Welcome to the new year, and to our annual primer on what to expect in the Asia-Pacific over the next 12 months. For each country or region, our authors highlight three events or trends to watch for in 2022. One point stands out: 2022 will be a year of political change in many countries in Asia. We will see presidential elections in the Philippines, South Korea, and Timor-Leste, and a federal election in Australia. Numerous other countries are undertaking local (India) or legislative (Japan) elections that won’t see top leadership change, but will bring with them political implications all the same. Even China will see a shake-up of political leaders at its once-every-five-years Party Congress, although don’t expect Xi Jinping himself to go anywhere.

A new calendar year doesn’t mean a sharp break from the past, though. Some of the major events of 2021, including the coup in Myanmar and the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, will continue to reverberate in 2022.

And, for the third year running, the COVID-19 pandemic will loom over all other events. 2021 started with vaccine roll-outs and hope for a post-pandemic normal; the year ended with the Omicron variant shutting borders around the world once again. In 2022, all of the Asia-Pacific will be struggling to balance health precautions with the increasingly pressing need to get economies back on track.

United States— Ankit Panda

Articulating strategy and clarifying direction – for China and beyond.

The Biden administration’s second year should see a continued emphasis on the Indo-Pacific region. The year will kick off with the release of highly anticipated strategic documents, including the administration’s National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review – both of which are expected to fixate on China to a large degree.

The China-U.S. relationship will remain on rocky ground, but competition will likely remain bounded; legislative elections in the United States and the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China, both in late 2022, should create sufficient incentives on both sides for a “managed” relationship. But pressure points will remain; expect to see the Biden administration continue to press to further multilateralize regional concern about Taiwan and press Beijing on human rights. At the same time, the administration’s already articulated focus on “guardrails” to prevent China-U.S. conflict will persist; the success of these efforts, however, will remain uncertain.

Beyond China, the administration will continue close consultations with allies on a range of economic and security matters. The alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia will receive top billing, and the strategic partnership with India will continue along existing trendlines. The Quad will continue to see emphasis; a second leader-level summit is likely to expand the cooperative scope of that partnership.

While the Biden administration should be expected to keep up its efforts to diplomatically engage North Korea, it does take two to tango and Pyongyang, as of the end of 2021, appears nowhere near ready to engage. As long as North Korea’s concerns about COVID-19 persist, the resumption of meaningful North Korea-U.S. engagement is unlikely. At best, the United States will seek to deter crises on the Korean Peninsula, which could be a particular concern should North Korea lash out at a potential new conservative-leaning administration in Seoul following the March 2022 elections.

2022 will also provide much-sought clarity on the direction of the new Australia-U.K.-U.S. (AUKUS) partnership. AUKUS’ ongoing 18-month study of the viability of the partnership’s flagship nuclear submarine project will take shape over the next year.

For an administration still in its early days, 2022 will be an opportunity to put U.S. policy in Asia on a new set of well-defined rails.

Filling the gap on an economic approach to Asia.

The challenge for the United States in 2022 will be to express a positive economic vision for the region. The administration’s support for liberalized trade is unlikely, but issues ranging from supply chain resiliency to infrastructure development will remain high on the agenda. Ending the pandemic, too, will continue to see focus.

Should in-person diplomacy resume with greater frequency in 2022, the administration could demonstrate a much more forward-leaning approach to the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Biden has emphasized ASEAN’s central role in Asia’s architecture and the possibility of in-person summits in late-2022 could provide an important opportunity.

Avoiding distractions outside Asia.

The Biden administration faced a challenging 2021, particularly with the ignominious exit from Afghanistan dominating headlines. While 2022 may not bring sharp turns, it’ll be an opportunity for Biden and his foreign policy advisers to make good on repeated assurances that the United States is primarily thinking abouts its national diplomatic and security interests in terms of the Indo-Pacific region.

A major threat, however, lies in the possibility of major crises outside the region that pull political capital and attention in Washington, D.C. away from Asia. As 2021 comes to a close, the shadow of conflict between Russia and Ukraine looms large, and the possibility of a total collapse in efforts to restore the 2015 agreement to limit Iran’s nuclear program can’t be neglected. Each of these could lead to substantial crises that would yet again keep an American president from fully committing American national resources and attention to Asia.

Japan— Thisanka Siripala

How long willJapan keep its COVID-19 border closures?

Japan’s border has remained closed to foreign travelers since the onset of the pandemic. The COVID-19 border measures – which allow citizens to enter and leave freely while keeping out foreign students as well as visa-holders, depending on the COVID-19 situation at one’s point of departure – have come under immense international scrutiny.

Despite the number of new COVID-19 cases plummeting to record lows after a deadly outbreak during the Tokyo 2020 Olympics, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio is not taking any chances with the rapid spread of Omicron. The Kishida administration has inherited its predecessor''s strict COVID-19 border measures, to the disappointment of tens of thousands of people waiting to enter Japan to join partners, begin new jobs, or start school. Just three weeks after cautiously re-opening to new visa holders, Kishida announced that Japan would close once again through the end of 2021.

Kishida came to power following two leadership changes that took place at the height of the pandemic. The international community will be monitoring Japan''s checkered COVID-19 border measures in the new year and waiting to see how the new administration will balance opening up the country while preventing a potential outbreak.

Japan’s upper house electionposes a political test.

Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), headed by Kishida, won the general election by a comfortable majority in October last year, defying predictions made by major news outlets. The main opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), on the other hand lost an unexpected 14 seats in the lower house after forming an alliance with other opposition parties, most controversially the Japan Communist Party (JCP), in a bid to consolidate opposition members in single member districts. The move is said to have led to the loss of hardline CDP voters.

The House of Councilors election set for the summer of 2022 will be an important test for both parties. The CDP elected a new relatively young leader, 47-year-old Kenta Izumi, after the resignation of its founder Edano Yukio, who took responsibility for its defeat in the general election. Kenta has the mammoth task of unifying the party, rebuilding its policy agenda to stand out from the LDP, and devising a new election campaign strategy to gain a wider support base focusing on regional Japan and younger constituents. The party faces an uncertain future as its political clout wanes.

The election result will also determine how successfully the LDP has portrayed a stable government and whether Kishida’s election promises can be advanced. The government has already come under fire for its $880 handout for every child in Japan, which will be distributed half in cash and half in coupons, instead of a full cash payout. The government also plans to raise medical expenses for some elderly people to fund stronger coordination among medical institutions in preparation for another potential outbreak, alongside plans to cut public spending. As the new administration begins to roll out more concrete policies, any future policy blunders or scandals could hinder its chances in the summer upper house election.

Japan continues its China balancing act.

With the previous Suga administration taking a more confrontational approach to China, the Kishida administration’s China policy is believed to be a realistic one. While serving as foreign minister under the Abe administration, Kishida was known as a pro-engagement China dove. But his victory in the LDP leadership race in October was dependent on aligning with the China hawk factions of the party.

As the new prime minister, Kishida has confirmed a U.S-centric foreign policy and cooperation with Taiwan as a sovereign state; he has also condemned human rights abuses against the Uyghur people by the Chinese government. The governing LDP party is stepping up talks to double Japan’s defense budget to 2 percent of GDP in light of China’s military build up and intensifying Sino-American rivalry.

While he has demonstrated a hardline stance stance against China, Kishida also expressed caution in pursuing a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics. It was only after immense international pressure that he announced he will not be sending officials or attend the opening ceremony.

The world will be watching how Kishida balances cooperation and confrontation in his first year as prime minister.

Koreas— Mitch Shin

South Korea elects a new president.

The South Korean presidential elections will be held on March 9, with the years-long housing price crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic at the top of voters’ minds. Lee Jae-myung, the presidential candidate of the ruling Democratic Party, and Yoon Suk-yeol, the presidential candidate of the conservative People Power Party, are neck-and-neck in the polls as of writing, hinting at a particularly tight race.

Some local polls from December 2021 have Yoon beating Lee by more than 5 percent, but other polls showed Lee with a narrow lead. The majority of South Koreans consistently support a change in governing party, so the mixed results suggests that Yoon has failed to garner strong support from the public. (There are also three candidates from minority parties – Ahn Cheol-soo, Sim Sang-jung, Kim Dong-yeon – but their polling support is in the single digits.)

Lee, who is hoping to be President Moon Jae-in’s successor, has introduced different ideas on domestic affairs to win over not only his party’s supporters but the moderates. He is comparing his political experience as mayor and governor with Yoon’s lifetime career as a prosecutor, with no experience in politics.

While the presidential election is getting all the attention, South Korea also has local elections set for June 1. In the past, the party that won the presidential election has also secured more victories in local polls. In 2018, the ruling Democratic Party won the local elections in a landslide victory at a time when Moon’s approval ratings touched 80 percent in the wake of the historical inter-Korean summit meetings. If Yoon pulls off a presidential win, it could mean a huge pendulum swing in the PPP’s favor at the local level as well.

The inter-Korean arms race continues.

With nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea still deadlocked, in 2022 North Korea will keep enhancing its nuclear and missile capabilities to strengthen its leverage in denuclearization negotiations. In the last few years, North Korea has tested various missile technologies, including short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. North Korea has not crossed the “red line” set by the United States – tests of nuclear weapons or intercontinental-range ballistic missiles – but Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un has pledged to advance the North’s military capability. In 2022, North Korea could choose to showcase more weapons of mass destruction and long-range ICBMs that can directly target the U.S. mainland.

Additionally, if Yoon Suk-yeol of the PPP wins the presidential election in March, North Korea would lose its leverage in the inter-Korean talks. Yoon would likely abandon the Moon administration’s peace process policy and place a priority on restoring Japan-South Korea relations.

Meanwhile, experts have argued for Seoul and Washington to advance the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by deploying more next-generation interceptors in the region to deter threats from North Korea and China. The arms race on the Korean Peninsula kicked off after the leaders of South Korea and the United States agreed to terminate the missile guidelines that had restricted the development of South Korea’s missiles.

As the countries involved in the issue have no interest in renewing nuclear talks at the moment, North Korea will likely introduce new missile programs in early 2022. But watch for missile developments from South Korea as well.

The fate of the end-of-war declaration looms.

Since President Moon Jae-in proposed officially ending the 1950-53 Korean War at the United Nations General Assembly on September 21, 2021, Seoul and Washington have been closely consulting on a draft for the declaration. However, amid the deadlock in bilateral North Korea-U.S. talks and the deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China – both of whom would have to sign such a declaration – there has been no progress announced on the initiative in the last three months. All...