【按：本月《堅離地報聯盟》選讀《The Diplomat》專文，聚焦外部大國在南海的行動策略。隨著美、日、歐等國持續增加軍事存在，以抗衡中國擴張，文章提醒此類「單邊行動」反而可能引發擦槍走火，將風險轉嫁予東南亞國家。作者主張外部夥伴應轉向與東協國家的合作與能力建設，例如聯合軍演、科技轉移、海巡合作等，落實東協主導的「印太展望」。澳洲被視為良好典範，積極透過雙邊協議與東協對話，而非炫耀武力。文章強調，南海和平須建立在地區共識與實質協作之上，外力的支持應建立於尊重區域中心性而非排擠之上。】

Instead of challenging China’s maritime claims unilaterally, outside powers would do better to collaborate more closely with Southeast Asian claimant states.

In the past few years, the South China Sea has become increasingly important not only for Southeast Asian claimant countries but also for their foreign partners. As a result, nations including the United States, Japan, Australia, Germany, and France have increased their presence in disputed waters in a variety of ways. But how do claimant countries think and consider this development? And how can external partners better engage productively to help manage the dispute? This article will argue that instead of taking unilateral actions, extra-regional powers should engage more with countries in the region.

Over the past year alone, allies and partners have sent some of their naval assets through contested parts of the South China Sea. In September of last year, Germany sent a warship through the Taiwan Strait, and in July of this year, France sent its aircraft carrier through the South China Sea. Aside from these European partners, the United States has been the most consistent country in conducting freedom of navigation operations in the region. This year, other countries like Japan and India are also conducting naval exercises in the South China Sea.

At the recent Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea diplomatic roundtable that was held in the Philippines earlier this month, both the German and French ambassadors to the country reiterated European partners’ commitment to maintaining peace and security in the South China Sea and therefore expect to see a greater European naval presence in the region.

This presence from Western partners and allies is part of the broader effort to contain China’s rise and its provocative, sometimes reckless behavior in the South China Sea. Therefore, to some extent, it can and should support the interests of Southeast Asian claimant states in the South China Sea.

However, Southeast Asian countries do not always view these outside engagements in the same way. Like many other issues, such as the response to AUKUS, Southeast Asian countries have a different view on this. Some countries, such as the Philippines, are openly welcoming more engagement from Western allies and partners, particularly the United States. Some others, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are more cautious. For its own part, China has openly condemned the presence of extra-regional powers in the South China Sea, saying that these nations are “provoking trouble,” and has said that the European countries have no right to intervene.

However, given its economic and strategic importance, the South China Sea is not only of interest to the countries in the region. All states have the right and interest to ensure the South China Sea remains peaceful and lawful. But it is important to ensure that those present consider the interests and concerns of regional countries.

Instead of unilaterally sending warships and other military assets to challenge China’s maritime claims and show their power, it would be better and more productive for Western powers to engage more with regional countries through cooperation and collaboration. This will increase the capacity of countries in the region to defend themselves and ensure peace and security in the disputed area.

These activities could include military exercises, capacity building, and even technology transfers to help the regional coast guard better respond to emerging issues, such as maritime cybersecurity.

There are at least three reasons why such activities will be more effective in maintaining security in the South China Sea than unilateral actions.

First, most Southeast Asian countries were colonized by Western nations. Therefore, they have a memory of how the region became an arena of great power interest and contestation, including during the Cold War. Therefore, there is some degree of suspicion towards the extra-regional security presence in the region.

Secondly, as a result of those collective memories, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) often asserts the importance of ASEAN centrality in the region, to ensure that it will not remain passive amid superpower contestation. ASEAN countries want to play an essential role in determining the activities and engagement of partner countries in the region. Despite many criticisms of its weaknesses and bureaucracy, ASEAN mechanisms should remain an important venue for extra-regional partners.

Venues such as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and the ASEAN Maritime Outlook should be manifested in real, tangible cooperation with extra-regional powers. The ASEAN Coast Guard Forum, which will gradually develop into a formal institution, should have an important role in determining and leading collaboration with regional partners.

Thirdly, the main reason these forms of cooperation are more useful than unilateral naval interventions is that such a presence always poses an unintended risk of escalation, particularly with China. In the past, we have seen videos of U.S. and Chinese aircraft maneuvering closely over the South China Sea. It is not impossible that at some point there will be an unintended clash due to reckless behavior from either or both sides.

If any unintended consequences result from the naval presence, Southeast Asian countries will bear the consequences and suffer the most from any escalation in the region.

By far, Australia has set a good example on how to engage with Southeast Asian partners. During the Australia-ASEAN Summit last year, Australia made a significant effort to hear the perspectives of Southeast Asian countries on shared maritime security issues. Moreover, the recent defense agreement between Indonesia and Australia, which reiterates and strengthens the commitment to dialogue and capacity building, will also improve security cooperation based on shared interests in the region.

The most important point here is not whether the region wants an extra-regional power presence in the South China Sea, but exactly what form this presence will take. Therefore, the ongoing negotiations between China and ASEAN on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea should ensure that extra-regional partners can be involved without undermining the centrality of Southeast Asian countries to affairs concerning their region.

By Guest Author Aristyo Rizka Darmawan

Aristyo Rizka Darmawan is a lecturer in international law at Universitas Indonesia and PhD Scholar at the Australian National University.

November 28, 2025