【按：本月《堅離地報聯盟》選讀《The Diplomat》評論，分析北韓如何回應美國與以色列對伊朗的空襲。文章指出，平壤雖按慣例譴責美方「非法侵略」、聲援伊朗主權，但整體措辭相對克制，顯示其更重視戰略盤算而非直接捲入衝突。一方面，伊朗若將軍備優先用於自保，反而可能令俄羅斯更依賴北韓補充武器供應；另一方面，俄羅斯對伊朗僅止於外交聲援，也讓平壤重新評估盟友承諾的可靠性。更重要的是，就在北韓釋出願與美國接觸訊號後，美方旋即對伊朗動武，無疑強化了金正恩政權原有信念：唯有穩固的核威懾，才是政權生存的最終保證。】

Just a week after North Korea signaled openness to dialogue, the U.S. launched a military operation against Iran with a stated goal of regime change.

When North Korea closed its Ninth Party Congress, it renewed its signal that it would be open for engagement with the United States if its former adversary was willing to accept the country as a sovereign, nuclear-armed state. Two days later, on February 28, U.S. forces executed military strikes against Iran, reportedly as a response to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, its record of hostile actions against Americans, and its sponsorship of violent proxies. 

For Pyongyang, the episode represented not only another example of Washington using force against an adversarial regime, but also an attack on a longstanding diplomatic and military partner. How, then, did the Kim regime respond?

In the nighttime hours of March 1, North Korean state media finally delivered a statement related to the Iran-Israel-U.S. war. It was a pro forma response attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson, similar in content and tone to North Korea’s response to the U.S. raid in Venezuela. Unlike Venezuela, however, there are different considerations and consequences for North Korea related to the war with Iran: namely, the dynamics vis-a-vis Russia and Pyongyang’s position toward engagement with the United States. 

What North Korea Said (and What It Meant)

It took a little more than 24 hours for North Korea to issue a statement on Iran, indicating that the Kim regime took time to assess the situation. The government likely queried Iranian diplomats posted in Pyongyang and North Korean officials abroad, while also observing what Beijing and the Kremlin had to say about the situation before moving too quickly with its own statement.

The statement was attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson, which constitutes low-level attribution by North Korean standards. This leaves space for the Kim regime to publish follow-on statements at higher levels, if deemed necessary.

The statement was published in both English and Korean on KCNA, the state media wire service, indicating that the audience was meant to be external.

The language, although bombastic to the uninitiated, was tame for the Kim regime. Stripped down to the core talking points, the North Korean government basically delivered five key points:

(1) The Israeli-U.S. attacks on Iran are an illegal form of aggression and the most “despicable form” of violation of sovereignty.
(2) Based on U.S. hegemonic posture and activities in the region, this was predictable.
(3) North Korea condemns this violation of international law and abuse of military power.
(4) Over the past year, the United States has played an increasingly destructive role in destroying global peace and stability.
(5) The “relevant and interested” parties in the region should correctly identify the aggressors in this war and fulfill their responsibility of restoring peace and stability in the Middle East.

Of note, the tone and format of the condemnation for the Iran conflict represented an incremental increase in rhetoric from the Kim regime compared to its response to the U.S. raid in Venezuela, but the final point clearly indicated that North Korea has no interest in injecting itself into the ongoing conflict. North Korea could have taken a stronger stance when directly addressing this issue, but in the end, the regime employed a tempered approach. 

Strategic Risks and Benefits for Pyongyang

On paper, it may seem like a conflict involving a longtime partner might be problematic for North Korea, but it has indirect risks and potential benefits for the Kim Jong Un regime.

The primary benefit comes from the fact that it disrupts an economic competitor with Russia. Both Iran and North Korea are major providers of war materiel to support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine. For Iran, this has included missiles, drones, and ammunition. But as Iran shifts to using its materiel for its own fight, it creates a gap that the Kim regime will likely be happy to fill. In that way, the Iran-Israel-U.S. war increases Russian dependency on North Korea, ceding additional influence and leverage to Pyongyang.

But the current conflict highlights a risk for North Korea when it comes to Russia’s dependability as a security partner. Both Iran and North Korea are treaty partners of Russia, with North Korea concluding its Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty in June 2024 and Iran concluding its version of the treaty with Russia in January 2025. Thus, Russia’s reluctance to provide any overt support beyond diplomatic condemnation in response to the Israel-U.S. attacks has raised allegations of alliance abandonment.

It is important to recognize that this is not a textbook case of abandonment, however. While the two countries indeed have similarly named treaties with Russia, the agreements have different terms and obligations. Simply put, the North Korea-Russia Treaty contained a formal defense commitment, while the Iran-Russia Treaty only provided for nonaggression and consultation amid conflict.

This is an important legal distinction but will still raise questions about alliance abandonment, particularly as Russia continues its war effort against Ukraine. There may be voices inside Pyongyang that argue that Moscow’s behavior in response to the attacks against Iran are not instructive of how Russia might support North Korea under similar circumstances owing to the distinct difference in treaty obligations. Others may contend that it is not the text of an agreement that matters, but tacit expectations between what should be close allies. 

It will be important to see how the two governments carry out their diplomatic messaging going forward with regard to alliance reassurance.

Implications for Potential North Korea-U.S. Engagement

In the recently published Ninth Party Congress readout, the Kim regime clearly signaled that it was willing to engage the United States if the U.S. government is willing to accept North Korea as a sovereign, nuclear-armed state. The additional challenge now is how Pyongyang will view White House negotiating behaviors even if this precondition were met. 

The U.S. government entered into talks with the Maduro and Khamenei regimes; in both cases, the government delivered an ultimatum and executed military action when its demands were not met. Taken with the fact that the U.S. government has demonstrated a willingness to employ coercive bargaining tactics against its own allies and partners, North Korea would logically be reticent to enter into talks with the White House.

In this context, North Korea’s tempered response to the strikes on Iran reflects strategic caution rather than indifference. Pyongyang has condemned the action, signaled solidarity with Tehran, and reiterated its opposition to U.S. military interventionism. But it has also avoided steps that would entangle it more directly in the crisis. For now, the Kim regime appears content to let events reinforce its long-held narrative: that only a robust nuclear deterrent can guarantee regime survival in a world where the United States remains willing to use force against governments it deems threatening.

Authors

Guest Author

Michael MacArthur Bosack

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative and the special adviser for government relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served as the deputy secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the deputy chief of government relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. You can follow him on X (Twitter) @MikeBosack.

March 03, 2026